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Abstract
This paper proposes a low-cost, easily realizable strategy to
equip a reinforcement learning (RL) agent the capability of
behaving ethically. Our model allows the designers of RL
agents to solely focus on the task to achieve, without having
to worry about the implementation of multiple trivial ethical
patterns to follow. Based on the assumption that the majority
of human behavior, regardless which goals they are achiev-
ing, is ethical, our design integrates human policy with the
RL policy to achieve the target objective with less chance of
violating the ethical code that human beings normally obey.
1 Introduction
As AI systems become part of our lives and sometimes make
decisions related to life-or-death consequences such as clin-
ical decision making (Bennett and Hauser 2013), awareness
should be raised to prevent machines from making not only
incorrect but also unethical decisions. Reinforcement learn-
ing (Sutton and Barto 1998) is designed to tackle intricate
real-world problems in rather short time (Strehl et al. 2006;
Brafman and Tennenholtz 2002) with a performance bound
(Strehl, Li, and Littman 2009); however, it relies heavily on
the quality of the reward functions provided as the inputs.
The problems of unintended and harmful behavior that may
emerge from poor design of AI systems are mentioned in
(Amodei et al. 2016).
Nevertheless, identifying all plausible ethical concerns for
an agent is challenging, not to mention implementing them
into the system. Here we consider a scenario in machine
ethics that objective functions are specifically designed to
reward a given goal without considering much ethical vio-
lation, so that penalties are not delivered when the agents
attempt to make unethical decisions. Consequently, even
though the goal or desired performance is achieved, some
unethical behavior may appear such as robbing a pharmacy
to get the drug or passing by an injured person without of-
fering any help when minimizing the traveling time.
To address these concerns, we need to design an RL agent
that can not only optimize the cumulative rewards but also
minimize the ethical violation. A straightforward solution is
to design the rewards for ethical moves. However, such strat-
egy suffers at least two drawbacks. First, it is costly, if by
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all means possible, to enumerate all plausible ethical/non-
ethical scenarios or rules, not to mention designing mean-
ingful rewards to them. Second, the judgment of ethics is
likely to be dynamic, depending on the present environment
or situation. Thus the hand-crafted ethical patterns might not
be valid given updated situations, making the design of gen-
eral ethical RL rewards challenging.
The research question we would like to address here is:
Is it possible to alleviate the burden of RL designers from
having to consider many ethical issues in the design? For
instance, to build a supermarket shopping agent, can an RL
designer simply focus on implementing the shopping capa-
bility of an agent (i.e. seeking and fetching items, checking
out in the counter, etc) instead of worrying about trivial eth-
ical decisions it may face (e.g., helping elder persons, as-
sisting lost kids, reporting wet floor, etc) and let our frame-
work take care of the learning of such behavior? One idea to
achieve such goal is to collect enough ethical behavior data
of human acting toward the given goal, and then apply the in-
verse reinforcement learning (IRL) (Amin and Singh 2016;
Evans, Stuhlmu¨ller, and Goodman 2016; Ng, Russell, and
others 2000; Sezener 2015) technique to learn an ethical
agent that follows a similar pattern. IRL and apprentice-
ship learning (Abbeel and Ng 2004) have been considered
as promising solutions due to their ability to extract rules
and policies of human behaviors. IRL is also admired for the
ability to generalize to unseen states, which greatly saves the
effort of manually enumerating reward.
However, there are several concerns for adopting IRL.
First, collecting a large amount of human data toward max-
imizing the reward is costly, and can bias the ethical learn-
ing since it is likely only data from a small number of per-
sonnel is collected. Second, the human data might not be
optimal (e.g., human not aware of a better solution); thus,
learning based on such imperfect data might lead to sub-
optimal outcomes. Third, IRL is insufficient for agents to
infer temporally complex norms (Arnold, Kasenberg, and
Scheutz 2017).
On the other hand, we have observed that although human
behavior data optimizing certain RL goals is costly to obtain,
general human data without targeting at the desired goals is
much easier to gather. For instance, in the previous shop-
ping bot example, it might not be as easy to gather many
people’s behavior in the supermarket compared to gather-
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ing general shopping or wandering data of people in any
commercial district. That says, we assume the accessibility
to the larger amount of general human data not necessary
aiming at the target goal of interest. The technical challenge
then becomes how an RL agent can learn to behave ethically
given such imperfect data, while still achieving high cumu-
lative rewards for the target goal of interests. We believe it is
achievable given the assumption that under normal circum-
stances the majority of humans do behave ethically.
Toward this direction, we propose a framework that works
as below: Besides the regular reward function to guide an
RL agent to achieve the specific objective of interests (e.g.,
shopping), we are further given a set of human action data
optimizing diverse objectives (e.g., jogging, walking) or
even without an apparent goal (e.g., wandering). The goal
is to design an RL agent that can not only optimize the tar-
get objective but also minimize the chance of unethical be-
havior. If it succeeds, the proposed framework can relieve
the burden for an RL developer to consider various ethical
issues, and focus mainly on designing an adequate reward
function to achieve the target objective. What is needed then
becomes a corpus of normal human behavior toward arbi-
trary goals.
This paper proposes Ethics Shaping, which leverages hu-
man data and reward shaping to design a more ethical rein-
forcement learner. We argue that as larger amount of human
data are being collected, the decisions that involve ethical is-
sues become clearer and aligned. Therefore, this paper only
focuses on the ethical decision makings that are indepen-
dent of the RL goals to emphasize on universal guidelines
of ethics that every human beings normally follow, such as
helping injured people or avoid hitting animals while driv-
ing. In our ethics shaping, the human data is not required to
be aligned with the objective functions of the agents as long
as it is from ethical human behavior. Consequently, ethics
shaping is low-cost and applicable to real-world scenarios
as we do not demand high-quality or goal-specific human
data.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of ethics shaping by
conducting experiments in three scenarios, Grab a Milk,
Driving and Avoiding, and Driving and Rescuing. These
schemes are designed to show how the learner’s behavior
could be altered by ethics shaping while facing matters hap-
pening in our daily lives. We further claim that ethics shap-
ing ought to overcome or alleviate ethical problems such
as side effects caused by optimizing the original objective
functions (Taylor et al. 2016) and dangerous exploration
(Amodei et al. 2016), which will be confirmed by the exper-
iment results. The main contributions can be summarized as
follows:
• Strategically we propose a high-level framework to train
an ethical RL agent based on a regular reward function
together with certain human data optimizing diverse ob-
jectives. It is of much lower cost compared to IRL since
we do not need human data geared towards optimizing the
target reward function.
• Technically we propose the ethics shaping model to adjust
the reward function through the interaction between the
RL and human policy.
• We coin three scenarios Grab a Milk, Driving and Avoid-
ing, and Driving and Rescuing to show how ethics shap-
ing balances ethical behavior and performance pursuit.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Recently, reinforcement learning has attracted attention for
beating the world champion of Go for the first time (Silver
et al. 2016; Borowiec 2016), since searching for effective
tactical decisions from such enormous states was thought
to be impossible. Reinforcement learning defines a class of
algorithms solving problems modeled as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP).
A Markov Decision Problem is usually denoted by the
tuple (S,A, T ,R, γ), where
• S is a set of possible states
• A is a set of actions
• T is a transition function defined by T (s, a, s′) =
Pr(s′|s, a), where s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A
• R : S×A×S 7→ R is a reward function. It can always be
reduced to S ×A 7→ R by marginalizing over next state
• γ is a discount factor that specifies how much long term
reward is kept.
To solve a MDP problem, the discounted long term reward
received should be maximized. Usually the infinite-horizon
objective is considered:
max
∞∑
t=0
γtR(st, at) (1)
Solutions come in the form of policies pi : S 7→ A, which
specify what action the agent will take in any given state
deterministically or stochastically. One way to solve this
problem is through SARSA (Rummery and Niranjan 1994),
where Q-valueQ(s, a) is calculated as an estimate of the ex-
pected future discounted reward for taking action a ∈ A in
state s ∈ S. The Q-value of the state-action pair is updated
according to the received value:
Q(st, at)←Q(st, at)+
α[rt + γQ(st+1, at+1)−Q(st, at)], (2)
where α is the learning rate. In this paper, -greedy is used
for exploration. The agent’s policy is modeled by Boltzmann
distribution
Pr
Q
(a|s) = e
Q(s,a)/τ∑
a′ e
Q(s,a′)/τ (3)
when aggregated with human data.
2.2 Reward Shaping
Without prior knowledge, most value-based reinforcement
learning algorithms are slow because they need to explore
state-action pairs uniformly at random in the early stage.
Only going through enough explorations and then updated
by associated rewards have been observed can the agent start
to exploit the experience by biasing its action selection to-
wards what it estimates to be good.
Reward shaping, motivated from behavioral psychology
(Skinner 1990), is an efficient way of including prior knowl-
edge in the learning problems so as to speed up the process.
Extra intermediate rewards are provided to enrich a sparse
base reward signal, providing the agent with useful gradi-
ent information. Reward shaping can be easily incorporated
with a variety of resources such as demonstration (Brys et
al. 2015) and verbal feedback (Brys et al. 2015). The shap-
ing reward H is usually integrated with the original reward
in the form of addition:
Rs(st, at, st+1) = R(st, at, st+1) +H(st, at, st+1). (4)
3 Ethics Shaping
We propose a method that gives additional penalties and
rewards according to the Kullback-Leibler divergence be-
tween the policy of the learning agent and the human policy
aggregated from human data. The human data D is a set of
state-action pairs recorded from human behaviors. Each pair
in D is treated as a positive human feedback since decisions
made by human beings are usually, from their prospective,
superior to other choices.
We generate the human policy from human data D ac-
cording to (Griffith et al. 2013), which integrates human
feedback to derive a stochastic policy by imposing binomial
distribution. The human feedback suggesting if certain ac-
tion is optimal is aggregated to be ∆s,a, which is defined as
the difference between the number of “right” and “wrong”
labels. Define that the probability an action a in a particular
state s is optimal as PrH(a|s). By assuming that PrH(a|s)
is independent of feedback to other actions and that there is
only one optimal action in each state, which indicates inde-
pendence conditions and the Bayes’ rule are applicable, they
formally derive the integrated stochastic policy of human:
Pr
H
(a|s) ∝ C∆s,a(1− C)
∑
j 6=a ∆s,j . (5)
The parameter C indicates the confidence level of human
feedback. The detailed derivation of the above result is avail-
able in their appendix section. In our case, since there is only
positive feedback given by each state-action pair in D, we
normalize the set {∆s,a| ∀a} to zero mean with respect to
states in order to approximate feedback scenario.
Inspired by (Raza, Johnston, and Williams 2016), which
utilizes reward shaping with deterministic policy of human
teacher to speed up the learning process, here we design
our shaping reward by imposing the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence between two stochastic policies of human and the
agent. With probability distribution of policies defined as
equation 3 and 5, the shaping reward becomes:
H(s, a) =

−cn ·DKL(PrQ(a|s)‖PrH(a|s)),
if PrQ(a = 1|s) > PrH(a = 1|s)
and PrH(a = 1|s) < τn
cp ·DKL(PrQ(a|s)‖PrH(a|s)),
if PrQ(a = 1|s) < PrH(a = 1|s)
and PrH(a = 1|s) > τp
0, otherwise
(6)
The K-L divergence term measures whether the current pol-
icy learned by the RL agent (denoted as PrQ(a|s)) is diverse
from the human policy (denoted as PrH(a|s)) induced from
human data given the current state s. If they are indeed sim-
ilar, then this value shall be close to zero (i.e. no shaping
is required). If this value is much larger than zero, meaning
that there is a discrepancy between human and RL policy.
We would then utilize equation 6 to identify if such action is
related to ethical issues. The situations can be grouped into
three categories:
• Negative ethical decisions. It is associated with the top
condition in equation 6 representing what machines
should not do but do such as cutting in line or hurting
people. Mathematically, if the probability for the agent
to make certain move a = 1 given the learned policy is
higher than that under human policy PrH(a = 1|s), and
the chance for human to conduct this action is very low
PrH(a = 1|s) < a small threshold τn, we then consider
such negative ethical decision happens and thus have to
teach our RL to avoid such action through providing a
penalty shaping value to the learner. Note that the value
of τn should be close to zero.
• Positive ethical decisions. It is associated with the 2nd
condition in equation 6 representing what machines
should do but do not do such as not ignoring severely
injured people while doing their own tasks. Mathemati-
cally, PrQ(a = 1|s) < PrH(a = 1|s) stands for the sit-
uation that a human has a stronger preference than the AI
agent for this action a, and PrH(a = 1|s) > τp indicates
that this action is indeed a very attractive move to the hu-
man since we set the threshold τp to a high probability.
Given the above conditions hold, we shall update the RL
policy toward performing action a given s through a pos-
itive H(s, a). Note that cn and cp allow the RL designer
to weight the importance of positive and negative ethical
conditions respectively.
• Others. No shaping is required as we do not recognize
either ethical issues or policy discrepancy.
Thanks to its simplicity in reward shaping, our model can
be seamlessly integrated into a variety of types of reinforce-
ment learning methods. However, we would like to mention
that our framework requires the human data to be collected
given diverse objectives, and therefore the non-ethical biases
can be minimized.
We argue that ethics shaping is able to deal with short-
comings of IRL suggested by (Arnold, Kasenberg, and
Scheutz 2017): (1) IRL may inherit unethical biases and
characteristics of the data of which it is trained and (2) IRL
is insufficient for agents to infer temporally complex norms.
For the first defect, unlike IRL which requires policies to
have descent performance and behave ethically at the same
time, in our model, human data is not required to be optimal
or even aligned with the target objective for reinforcement
learning. The reason is that the integrated human policy from
human data is capable of recognizing which ethical decision
making has happened under our claim that universal ethical
code should be obeyed by most of the people. For the sec-
ond drawback, temporally complex norms can be learned in
our model because in equation 5, we may deploy queue data
structure for each state to maintain the total number of ∆s,j
and the human policy derived from equation 5 will be up-
dated according to incoming state-action pairs. Therefore,
when such norms vanish, penalties or rewards will not be
given to bias action choices as well.
4 Experiments
In this section, we will demonstrate that the ethics shaping
algorithm can make the SARSA algorithm perform more
ethically. The same concept can be adopted to other RL
models in a similar manner. Instead of considering the two
previous scenarios, Cake or Death (Armstrong 2015) and
Burning Room (Abel, MacGlashan, and Littman 2016), in
which the number of states is fairly small, we propose three
tasks Grab a Milk, Driving and Avoiding, and Driving and
Rescuing which are closely related to our everyday lives.
The main advantage is that the number of states is larger
and therefore can be more closely related to the real-world
scenarios.
In the experiments, all human policies are synthesized by
random walk with ethical rules and the confidence level of
human feedback C is set to 0.95 since we would like to fo-
cus on how much ethics shaping can influence reinforcement
learners. For algorithms with and without ethics shaping, the
best performances are reported in terms of learning rate α,
discount factor γ, and the scale parameters cn, cp in shaping
rewardH.
4.1 Grab a Milk
Route planning is a classic task for reinforcement learning
and robotic techniques (Lin 1992). The Grab a Milk scenario
is a basic route planning problem with ethical issues that we
should carefully deal with. In a room with walls, objects and
milk, the robot should manage to reach the milk as soon as
possible. The robot will receive a huge penalty when facing
a wall because it is time-consuming to cross it. In contrast,
the robot may receive no penalty to small objects as long as
the decision results in a faster route. However, what if the
small object is a baby? Ethical human would normally opt
to avoid crossing babies. To show the scenario that includes
both positive and negative ethical decisions, we further ex-
tend the scheme with crying babies. Unlike the case of other
babies, it would be better if crying babies could get helped
instead of being neglected, which, in a sense, represents eth-
ical decisions that need robots voluntarily to make.
We simplify the problem to a 10 by 10 grid room with a
robot starts at (0, 0) and a milk is positioned at (9, 9). There
are 16 babies in the room and five of them are crying for
attention. The goals of this task can be stated as follows.
• Primary goal: minimize steps to the milk
• Sub-goals: (1) soothe as many crying babies as possible,
(2) avoid crossing non-crying babies.
The MDP has four actions which allow the robot to move to
neighboring grids. If the robot moves to grids with babies,
crying babies will be comforted but other babies will get
hurt. A state is represented by the coordinate where the robot
is currently at. The defective reward function is:
R(s, a) =
{
20, if the robot get the milk
−1, otherwise (7)
where the reward from soothing crying babies and the
penalty from hurting babies are not provided and need to
be learned through ethics shaping from human data. Human
trajectories are generated from random walk while obeying
rules that quiet babies should not be crossed and human be-
ings will choose to comfort crying babies when they are ad-
jacent to those babies both with 0.95 probability.
There are 48,620 optimal solutions (18 steps to the milk)
for the defective reward function and ideally there exist
some routes that both avoid non-crying babies and comfort
crying babies as many as possible. Figure 2 and 3 display
how the agent improves at the two sub-goals through ethics
shaping. Note that the agent actually helps more babies than
human beings because the reward propagation mechanism
in reinforcement learning makes the learner come up with
more thorough plans. Unlike apprenticeship learning which
directly imitates human behaviors, ethics shaping enables
reinforcement learner not to be biased by inadequate deci-
sions of human beings. Additionally, Figure 1 suggests that
the extra tasks do not significantly affect the convergence.
Figure 1: SARSA algorithm with and without ethics shap-
ing in Grab a Milk. The first 4,000 episodes are plotted to
show detailed information. Average over 150 runs, with 1
s.e. errorbars.
Figure 2: Number of babies crossed vs. number of episodes.
Average over 1000 runs are plotted with 1 s.e. errorbars.
Figure 3: Number of babies getting helped vs. number of
episodes. Average over 1000 runs with 1 s.e. errorbars.
4.2 Driving and Avoiding
Since autonomous cars have attracted attention for ideally
being able to dramatically reduce the number of traffic ac-
cidents, some ethical issues (Bonnefon, Shariff, and Rah-
wan 2015; Goodall 2014) have been claimed for security.
We would like to deploy this toy example to demonstrate
that ethics shaping is capable of dealing with driving issues
when the reward function is incomplete.
Our car driving simulation is similar to the second
experiment in (Abbeel and Ng 2004) except that cars
could be driving in all of the lanes and sometimes there
are seriously wounded cats lying in certain lanes which
we should avoid so as not to make them worse. We are
driving faster than all of the other cars and the cats relatively
approach us the fastest since they are unable to move. Even
though dying cats may not directly relate to machine ethics
which usually indicates human-machine interactions, we
use dying cats to represent other objects such as humans
injured in car accidents or elderly people with dementia.
To be a good driver, it is also encouraged to drive straight
when switching lanes is not needed. The problem definition
without considering ethics is as follows:
Objective (Driving and Avoiding)
min
A={a1,a2,··· ,an|ai∈A}
L(A),
where
L(A) =
∑
ai∈A
p1 · 1[[a ∈ Collision]]−
p2 · 1[[a = straight]],
A is all possible actions, Collision is the set of actions that
might collide with one of the cars, and straight is the action
to drive straight. p1 and p2 are set to 20 and 0.5 respectively
in our experiment.
By this experiment, we would like to test whether the
ethics shaping technique is capable of making reinforcement
learners dodge dying cats as well as be good drivers. The
goals of this task can be stated as follows.
• Primary goal: avoid collisions
• Sub-goals: (1) drive straight, (2) dodge dying cats.
Manually generated human trajectories aim at avoiding run-
ning over dying cats and averting car collisions. Some ran-
domness is added to give variety. The MDP has three ac-
tions, which allow the agent to steer smoothly to one of the
neighboring lanes and go straight. There are five features in-
dicating what lane the car is currently at and the other twelve
features indicating the discretized distance of the closest car
and the closest cat in the left, current and the right lane re-
spectively. The incomplete reward function is defined as the
negative loss function as described above.
This scenario is more difficult than Grab a Milk since
sometimes it is required to make decisions between collision
with cars and hitting wounded cats. Collisions are occasion-
ally unavoidable due to the limited horizon of the agent. In
this experiment, the human trajectories are generated with
a rule that avoiding hurting cats first and then avoiding col-
lisions by switching to the other lanes. The performance is
evaluated by cumulative reward through one episode. It is
shown that ethics shaping is able to acquire descent perfor-
mance and still preserve ethical behavior. As Figure 4 and
5 suggest, in the reinforcement learning process, there is
no significant difference between two algorithms with re-
spect to cumulative rewards and number of collisions. Addi-
tionally, the significant reduction in the number of cats get-
ting hit is shown in Figure 6, which provides an insight that
ethics shaping is able to resolve the conflicts between per-
formances and ethical decisions.
4.3 Driving and Rescuing
Driving and Rescuing is similar to Driving and Avoiding in
terms of environments. However, in this scenario, instead of
avoiding running over dying cats, the sub-task for the agent
is to rescue the dementia elderly trapped in the traffic by tak-
ing them into the car. We simplify the problem by consider-
ing that to rescue the elderly it is required to drive through
their positions and the process takes no time. Consequently,
Figure 4: SARSA with and without ethics shaping in the
Driving and Avoiding experiment on cumulative rewards.
Average over 150 runs with 1 s.e. errorbars.
Figure 5: Number of collisions vs. number of episodes. Av-
erage over 150 runs with 1 s.e. errorbars.
Figure 6: Number of cats getting hit within one episode. Av-
erage over 150 runs with 1 s.e. errorbars.
it is the opposite problem of Driving and Avoiding in which
the agent should avoid crossing cats.
The problem is more challenging than Driving and Avoid-
ing since there are more choices to stay away from a cat;
however, to rescue the elderly, the action toward them is
the only option. As Figure 7 and 8 suggest, to rescue
more elders, it is inevitable for human beings to experience
more collisions than in Driving and Avoiding. Even though
SARSA algorithm with ethics shaping seems to perform
slightly worse, it is reasonable since sacrifice (i.e. switch-
ing lanes) is needed to rescue elders. A piece of supporting
evidence is that Figure 8 reveals there is no much difference
between two approaches in terms of the number of colli-
sions. With regard to the number of elders getting rescued,
a significant change is shown in Figure 9, which verifies the
ability of ethics shaping to make the learner behave ethically
while pursuing better performance. Another conclusion can
be made in the three experiments that the problem of dan-
gerous exploration (Amodei et al. 2016) is alleviated since
in the learning process, penalties are given while the agents
making unethical decisions. Consequently, the total number
of unethical decision making is greatly reduced compared
with original reinforcement learners.
Figure 7: SARSA algorithm with and without ethics shaping
in Driving and Rescuing on cumulative rewards. Average
over 150 runs are plotted with 1 s.e. errorbars.
5 Related Work
Machine ethics (Anderson and Anderson 2011), a project
that aims to make an AI system’s decision-making pro-
cedure obey some norms and ethics, has drawn attention
since the AI systems have become part of the lives of mod-
ern people. Some proactive issues (Ring and Orseau 2011;
Bostrom and Yudkowsky 2014; Bostrom 2014) have been
proposed to discuss possible situations that might harm the
interactions between human and machines. Several issues
are resulted from ill-designed objective functions (Amodei
et al. 2016), which our work aims to solve. To the best of
our knowledge, the idea that employs ordinary human data
to learn ethical behaviors has not been proposed. We provide
a brief survey of existing approaches that relate to ethical de-
cision making and learning.
Figure 8: Number of collisions vs. number of episodes. Av-
erage over 150 runs, with 1 s.e. errorbars.
Figure 9: Number of elders getting rescued within one
episode. Average over 150 runs with 1 s.e. errorbars.
5.1 Rule-Based Approaches
(Briggs and Scheutz 2015) proposes a mechanism to deter-
mine when and how it is best to reject directives from human
interlocutors. Under their architecture, ‘fecility conditions’
are reasoned to ensure matters such as the agent know how
to accomplish the task and accomplishing the task does not
violate normative principles. Those conditions are formu-
lated as a logical expression along with inference rules.
Horty logic (Horty 2001) is a deontic logic (Clarke 1975)
that allows reasoning about multiple agents and their ac-
tions. (Arkoudas, Bringsjord, and Bello 2005; Bringsjord,
Arkoudas, and Bello 2006) propose similar approaches that
utilize Horty logic to compose ethical semantics. However,
this formalism suffers from similar limitations as Briggs and
Scheutz’s approach: ethical uncertainty is not allowed for
decision making, active learning of the ethical rules is not
permitted, and all rules should be rendered in advance. With
the aid of ethics shaping, there is no need to enumerate all
possible ethical rules since the integrated policy from human
data is able to suggest ethical moves with our claim that most
of the people would obey ethical code.
5.2 Learning-Based Approaches
Richer kinds of materials have been explored to achieve
value alignment (Russell, Dewey, and Tegmark 2015),
which is a property of an agent indicating that it can only
pursue goals beneficial to humans (Russell, Dewey, and
Tegmark 2015; Soares and Fallenstein 2014). (Riedl and
Harrison 2016) claims that stories are necessarily reflections
of the culture and society; consequently, stories are a wealth
of data where cultural values tacitly hold. They first generate
a plot graph from crowdsourced stories using the technique
described by (Li et al. 2013). However, stories may not be
detailed enough to describe sophisticated behavior such as
driving cars.
It is a challenging problem for agents to derive their ob-
jective functions while making decisions. (Armstrong 2015)
uses Bayesian learning to update beliefs about the utility
functions that best match ethical behaviors. Adopting the
concept of utility functions as well, (Abel, MacGlashan,
and Littman 2016) considers the problem of ethical learning
as learning an ethical utility function that is a part of hid-
den state of Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP). The difference with Armstrong’s work is that the
agent is not maximizing a changing meta-utility function.
Instead, the uncertainty of the ethical utility function is cou-
pled with the uncertainty in the rest of the world. (Arnold,
Kasenberg, and Scheutz 2017) claims that IRL by itself is
insufficient for agents to infer norms that are temporally
complex, unless each state contains sufficient information to
characterize the history of the agent with respect to norms.
To combine the strength of RL and logical representations,
they propose a hybrid approach that agent would prioritize
adherence. The agents would maximize the reward function
over only those state-action pairs that maximally satisfy the
norms.
6 Conclusion
Ethics shaping is proposed to make reinforcement learners
not only achieve the expected performance and the goals but
also comply with ethical rules. It utilizes reward shaping and
stochastic policy from human data to balance ethical behav-
ior and performance pursuit by providing additional reward.
The reward is given if the move is related to ethics identi-
fied by integrated human policy. It can be incorporated with
a variety of reinforcement learning algorithms since most of
the reinforcement learning frameworks rely on reward func-
tions.
We coin three scenarios Grab a Milk, Driving and Avoid-
ing, and Driving and Rescuing to simulate real-life matters
that everybody would possibly experience. In the three ex-
periments, we show the capability of ethics shaping that it
could outperform human policies with respect to positive
ethical decisions (e.g., saving people) since reinforcement
learners provide thorough plans even only local information
is given. Additionally, although under more constraints than
original problems, ethics shaping still achieves competitive
performances with RL algorithms without ethics shaping.
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